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IT’S COMPLICATED: WHY THE VOLCKER RULE IS 
UNWORKABLE 
Charles A. Piasio* 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
Unless you have been living under a proverbial rock for the past 
three years, you are aware that America is in the midst of 
economically-troubling times stemming from the recent international 
financial crisis.1  On the heels of said crisis and its prominent role in 
the subsequent and ongoing recession, elected officials, consumer 
protection advocates, and many American citizens have been and are 
still calling for financial reform, particularly in the banking industry.2  
Congress responded to these calls by enacting the most expansive 
financial reform since the 1930s in the form of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).3 
Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, commonly referred to as the 
“Volcker Rule,”4 prohibits a banking entity from “engag[ing] in 
proprietary trading” or “acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any equity, 
partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a hedge 
 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.B.A., 2009, 
Providence College; B.A., 2008, Providence College.  I would like to thank Professor 
Stephen Lubben for his invaluable guidance, assistance, and patience throughout 
the development of this Comment; Professor Jamie Pukl Werbel for teaching me the 
fundamentals of legal writing; and my editor Joseph Jakas for his constant support 
and feedback. 
 1  See Craig Torres, Fed Cuts Outlook for 2012, Sees 8.6% Jobless, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 
2, 2011, 2:32 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-02/fed-lowers 
-economic-growth-outlook-for-next-year-sees-8-6-unemployment.html. 
 2  See Michael McAuliff & Max J. Rosenthal, Occupy Wall Street’s Message Gains 
Momentum in Congress, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2011, 4:15 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/02/occupy-wall-street-congress_n 
_1071745.html. 
 3  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 4  See generally David Cho & Binyamin Appelbaum, Obama’s ‘Volcker Rule’ Shifts 
Power Away from Geithner, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2010, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/21 
/AR2010012104935.html.  The rule is named after its original proponent, famous 
economist and former chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker. 
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fund or private equity fund,” subject to certain exceptions.5  As this 
Comment will expound upon, defining what exactly is—and is not—
proprietary trading in the banking context is no easy task,6 but for 
now it can be best understood as “when a [bank] trades for direct 
gain instead of commission dollars . . . from processing trades.”7  
According to Senators Jeff Merkley and Carl Levin—the authors of 
the initial provisions on proprietary trading and conflicts of interest 
within the Volcker Rule—the prohibition of proprietary trading 
stems from the significant contribution of banks’ proprietary trading 
losses to “the freezing of global markets, helping to precipitate more 
than $17 trillion in investment losses and necessitating bailouts by 
governments all over the world.”8 
The significance of the role proprietary trading played in the 
banking crisis, and the subsequent “freezing of global markets,” 
however, is far from clear.9  There is evidence that banks’ losses were 
primarily due to extensive decreases in the value of long-term 
investments, most notably mortgage-backed securities that banks held 
to maturity rather than traded, in addition to collateralized debt 
obligations repurchased from off-balance-sheet funding vehicles.10  
 
 5  12 U.S.C. § 1851(a), (d) (2006). 
 6  See Kate Kelly, Banks Gear Up for a Battle, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2010, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703422904575039502973649716. 
html. 
 7  Definition of Proprietary Trading, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com 
/terms/p/proprietarytrading.asp#axzz1cbW3StI3 (last visited Aug. 27, 2011). 
 8  Senator Jeff Merkley & Senator Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on 
Proprietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 515 (2011). 
 9  See Charles Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 39, 41–42  (2011). 
 10  Id. at 41 (citing RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES 173 (2010)) (arguing that 
holding the mortgage-backed securities instead of the proprietary trading of such 
securities led to banks’ large losses); Michael Mckenzie, ‘Super-senior’ CDO Investors 
Flex Their Muscles, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms 
/s/0/8473466c-0a85-11dd-b5b1-0000779fd2ac.html.  It bears mentioning that even if 
the banks held mortgage-backed securities and related collateralized debt obligations 
to maturity, they were probably using them as part of a repo trade to get cash for 
other investments, and that trade could lead to the liquidity effect the Senators 
describe, without being central to the financial crisis generally.  Mortgage-backed 
securities are debt obligations that represent rights (or claims) to the cash flows 
(proceeds) of mortgage loans.  The mortgage loans purchased from banks and other 
originators are assembled into pools by a separate entity (either a governmental or 
private entity) that then issues securities that represent claims on the principal and 
interest payment made by borrowers on the pool’s loans.  See Mortgage-Backed 
Securities, SEC (July 23, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm.  
These securities greatly depreciated as borrowers (often of subprime mortgage 
loans) failed to make payments. Collateralized debt obligations are trusts that sell 
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On the other hand, there is also evidence that proprietary trading 
contributed substantially to the losses that some large commercial 
banks suffered.  For instance, Goldman Sachs recently disclosed an 
additional $5 billion in investment losses, which brought their total 
losses stemming from the financial crisis to $13.5 billion.11 
More importantly, the idea that proprietary trading was one of 
the driving forces behind the financial crisis is highly debatable.  In 
fact, Mr. Volcker himself has actually said that “proprietary trading in 
commercial banks was . . . not central” to the crisis.12  Furthermore, 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner testified that “most of the 
losses that were material . . . did not come from [proprietary trading] 
activities.”13  Senators Merkley and Levin state two particular goals of 
the prohibition: “to protect (1) the U.S. economy from suffering 
another debilitating financial crisis; and (2) taxpayers from again 
being called upon to rescue failed financial firms.”14  But in his 
Harvard Business Law Review article on how the Volcker Rule fails to 
consider the complexities of evolving financial markets, Charles 
Whitehead argues that “the Rule’s ultimate intention was less to cure 
a particular cause of the financial crisis and more to champion the 
populist view that commercial banking should be separated from 
investment banking.”15  This is evidenced by frequent arguments by 
proponents of the rule—including Senators Merkley and Levin—that 
proprietary trading had distracted banks from their fiduciary duties 
to their customers and banks’ more traditional activities such as real 
estate and small-business loans.16 
Serious doubts have been raised as to whether the Volcker Rule 
 
bonds to raise money with the overriding aim of using the money to procure assets 
with a greater yield (i.e., return) than that of the bonds sold to raise money for the 
CDO.  In this context, mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations 
go hand-in-hand because the mortgage-backed securities often were a significant part 
of a bank’s collateralized debt obligation’s assets.  See Peter Eavis, CDOs explained, 
CNN MONEY (Nov. 26, 2007, 10:36 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/24 
/magazines/fortune/eavis_cdo.fortune/index.htm. 
 11  See Francesco Guerrera & Kara Scannell, Goldman Reveals Fresh Crisis Losses, FIN. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2011, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f1dcbf2e-1f56 
-11e0-8c1c-00144feab49a.html#axzz1cbMyWCSW. 
 12  Kim Dixon & Karey Wutowski, Volcker: Proprietary Trading Not Central to Crisis, 
REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2010, 4:55 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/30/us-
financial-regulation-volcker-idUSTRE62T56420100330. 
 13  Hearing Before the Congressional Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony 
of Sec. of Treasury Timothy Geithner). 
 14  Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 515. 
 15  Whitehead, supra note 9. 
 16  See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 539. 
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will accomplish its goals.17  Perhaps most notably, Volcker himself has 
recently said that even with the Dodd-Frank Act, the problem of 
banks that are too economically significant to be allowed to fail has 
“not yet been convincingly settled,” despite being “the heart of the 
reform question.”18  But the Volcker Rule might not only fail in 
rectifying the problems that led to its creation, it may also create a 
slew of other problems such as eliminating potentially profitable 
activities of banks across the board.19  It follows that this would result 
in banks not only decreasing lending, but also lending at less 
favorable rates.20  Further, the rule may decrease the competitiveness 
of U.S. banks in the truly global market.21  It may also create 
uncertainty for banks that could stifle investing activities that the 
legislature did not intend to be prohibited.  Even worse, the rule may 
incentivize banks to find out what is allowed under the Volcker Rule 
by pushing the envelope or even attempting to disguise proprietary 
trading as something else, such as market-making.22 
Whether any of these ill-effects will materialize is only speculative 
at this point.  Regardless, the Volcker Rule is borderline 
unworkable.23  This Comment fleshes out the Volcker Rule and the 
problems that arise from the law’s ambiguity, complexity, and sheer 
size.  Part II describes the background that led to the Volcker Rule, 
including a brief history of financial institution regulation, focusing 
on the collapse of Lehman Brothers as an illustrative example.  Part 
III details the Volcker Rule and its ban on proprietary trading, 
including the ambiguities that play a significant role in making the 
rule ineffective.  Part IV argues that the Volcker Rule in its current 
form is not only misguided, but borderline unworkable and at the 
very least unduly burdensome.  This part explains that the statutory 
language of the ban is too vague while identifying the problems that 
 
 17  See Douglas J. Elliott, Why The Volcker Rule is Still a Bad Idea, CNN MONEY (Mar. 
21, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/21/markets/volcker-rule 
-banks/index.htm. 
 18  Bonnie Kavoussi, Paul Volcker: Too-Big-To-Fail Problem ‘Not Yet Convincingly 
Settled’, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 20, 2011, 3:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2011/09/20/paul-volcker-too-big-to-fail-dodd-frank_n_971593.html. 
 19  See Elliott, supra note 17 (“It will also raise costs and lower revenues for banks, 
pushing them to charge customers more in other ways.”). 
 20  Id. (“The Volcker Rule will raise the cost of credit to our suffering economy.”). 
 21  See Suzanne McGee, Wall Street’s Loopholes, UPSTART (Sept. 10, 2010), 
http://upstart.bizjournals.com/views/columns/streetwise/2010/09/10/wall-street 
-investment-banks-may-find-way-to-skirt-proprietary-trading-ban-in.html. 
 22  Id.; see also infra Part 0. 
 23  See James B. Stewart, Volcker Rule, Once Simple, Now Boggles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 
2011, at B1. 
PIASIO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2013  4:09 PM 
2013] COMMENT 741 
the ambiguities create as well as the adverse effects from trying to 
reconcile such ambiguities.  Further, Part IV concludes that such 
ambiguities and possible loopholes cannot be eliminated under the 
rule’s current misguided rules-based approach, and from both a legal 
and economic standpoint, such an approach will lead to adverse 
effects on the American banking industry.  Part V sets forth the 
recommendation that Congress should repeal the ban in favor of 
legally mandated oversight to prevent and penalize 
unethical/reckless proprietary trading including full disclosure of 
banks’ trading activity to the appropriate regulatory bodies who will 
have discretion in enforcement of the rule.  In Part VI, this Comment 
concludes by emphasizing why Congress needs to consider the 
shortcomings of the Volcker Rule immediately rather than simply 
letting the ban play out and hoping for the best. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The substantive federal regulation of the banking and securities 
industries that is so well-established today really did not begin to gain 
steam until the 1930s.  Following the stock market crash of 1929 and 
the Great Depression, President Roosevelt and Congress passed a 
series of laws setting forth strong regulations of said industries, 
including the Banking Act of 193324 (“Glass-Steagall Act”), the 
Securities Act of 193325 (“Securities Act”), and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).26  The Glass-Steagall Act 
established an array of significant reforms, most notably the creation 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)27 and the 
restriction of bank activities to establish a separation between 
financial institutions involved in commercial banking and those 
engaged in investment banking and securities trading.28  The creation 
of federal deposit insurance was deemed essential to protect 
depositors, and the imposition of restrictions on banks’ activities was 
 
 24  Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 
(1933). 
 25  Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933). 
 26  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934). 
 27  Glass-Steagall Act §§ 8, 12B, 48 Stat. at 168–90.  The FDIC is a U.S. 
government corporation that provides deposit insurance, which guarantees the safety 
of deposits in member banks, up to $250,000 per depositor per bank as of January 
2012.  The FDIC also supervises and examines certain financial institutions like banks 
for safety and soundness, performs certain consumer-protection functions, and 
manages banks in receivership (failed banks).  See FDIC Mission, Vision, and Values, 
FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/about/mission/index.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2011). 
 28  Glass-Steagall Act §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. at 184–85, 188–89, 194. 
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viewed as necessary because “commercial bank participation in 
securities trading was identified as a major cause of the financial 
collapse [of 1929].”29  The result was that banks were effectively 
barred from engaging in investment banking activities, and 
consequently, there was almost complete separation from 
commercial banks and firms engaging in investment banking.30 
On the other hand, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act 
instituted regulations on the investment banking industry.31  The 
Securities Act focused primarily on regulation of new issuances of 
securities.32  In particular, it prohibited the sale or offer of any 
security that was not registered, or did not qualify for an exemption 
under section 3, subsection A of the Securities Act, and also 
mandated specific disclosures by the issuers of the securities.33  In 
contrast, the Exchange Act mandated new rules for the secondary 
trading of securities and is probably best known for its creation of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to monitor and regulate 
financial markets in the United States.34  Collectively, these three new 
laws aimed to instill confidence in America’s financial system by 
limiting the risks that investors and depositors create.35 
The division of commercial banking from investment banking 
under the Glass-Steagall Act remained in place for decades.36  But 
both technological and market changes—i.e., the development of 
derivatives and securitization37—provided “powerful new financial 
 
 29  Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 517 (citing JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE 
GREAT CRASH: 1929, at 43–65, 100–15, 147–54 (Mariner Books 2009) (1954)).  Many 
people blamed the stock market crash in 1929 on commercial banks that were too 
zealous in putting deposits at risk in the stock market, which the Glass-Steagall’s 
separation of commercial and investment banks put a swift end to.  See Joshua 
Brockman, Death of the Brokerage: The Future of Wall Street, NPR (Sept. 22, 2008), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94894707. 
 30  Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 517. 
 31  Id. 
 32  48 Stat. 74. 
 33  Id. 
 34  48 Stat. 881. 
 35  See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 517. 
 36  Id. at 518. 
 37  See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 972 
(“During the 1980s and 1990s, federal regulators opened loopholes in the Glass-
Steagall wall in response to growing competitive pressures in the financial 
marketplace.  In 1987 and 1989, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) allowed bank 
holding companies to underwrite debt and equity securities to a limited extent by 
establishing ‘Section 20 subsidiaries.’  During the 1990s, the FRB progressively 
relaxed its restrictions on Section 20 subsidiaries.  By 1997, those subsidiaries could 
compete effectively with securities firms for underwriting mandates.”). 
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tools” for both commercial and investment banks, and the ideology 
of financial regulation began to shift towards deregulation among 
lawmakers and regulators.38  In 1999, President Clinton and Congress 
passed the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (“Graham-
Leach-Bliley Act”), which repealed the separation of commercial and 
investment banks restriction of the Glass-Steagall Act.39  Under the 
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, commercial banks were now permitted to 
invest and trade securities for their own accounts as well as offer 
banking, securities, asset management services, and even insurance 
products under one corporate umbrella.40  As a result, commercial 
banking groups were now in direct competition with investment 
banks.41  The purpose of the act was “to reduce and, to the maximum 
extent practicable, to eliminate the legal barriers preventing 
affiliation among depository institutions, securities firms, insurance 
companies, and other financial service providers.”42  Congress 
believed that permitting such multi-service financial institutions 
“[would] also lead to greater efficiency, lower interest rates, and 
greater access to credit.  It [would] also lead to greater innovation in 
the new marketplace with greater competition.”43  Due to intense 
competition and the evolution of complex financial markets, both 
commercial and investment banks grew dramatically, and continue to 
grow today.44  Notably, this was only fourteen years ago, and 
considering that banks did grow dramatically, it is interesting that the 
banking crisis has led to many advocating a return to the pre-
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act regulatory climate with seemingly little 
consideration of other possible solutions.45  As mentioned, the 
financial markets have become much more complex over the years, 
and it is hard to understand why the legislature has approached this 
issue as a one-way-or-the-other situation. 
 
 38  See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 518 (“The rise of competition from 
investment banking and other ‘shadow banking’ firms put pressure on commercial 
bankers, who responded by seeking to engage in activities that had long been walled 
off.”).  
 39  Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), Pub. 
L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999). 
 40  Examples include Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup, Inc. 
 41  See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 519 (citing Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., How 
Should We Respond to the Growing Risks of Financial Conglomerates?, in FINANCIAL 
MODERNIZATION AFTER GRAHAM-LEACH-BLILEY 65, 65 n.1 (Patricia C. McCoy ed., 
2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=291859). 
 42  H.R. Rep. No. 106-74, at 138 (1999). 
 43  145 Cong. Rec. S13883, S13912 (Nov. 4, 1999) (testimony of Sen. Evan Bayh). 
 44  See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 520. 
 45  See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8. 
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No matter how one identifies the role that proprietary trading 
played in the financial collapse of 2008, it is safe to say that the 
Volcker Rule or any significant financial regulation reform would not 
have occurred but for the collapse.46  In January 2009, the Group of 
Thirty,47 chaired by Paul Volcker, released a broad financial reform 
proposal, and discussion of the issue began at Senate Banking 
Committee hearings beginning that spring.48  The Obama 
Administration’s initial reform proposal did not significantly consider 
proprietary trading because the draft legislation that the Treasury 
Department sent to Congress in August 2009 did not include 
restrictions on proprietary trading.49  On November 10, 2009, Senator 
Dodd released his first comprehensive financial reform bill, which 
again did not include any provision restricting proprietary trading or 
conflicts of interest.50  On December 11, 2009, the House of 
Representatives voted to pass financial reform legislation, which did 
not include any restrictions on proprietary trading.51 
According to Senators Merkley and Levin, the next major date in 
the legislative history of the Volcker Rule was on January 21, 2010, 
when President Obama declared his support for a ban of proprietary 
trading.52  The inclusion of the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Act 
seemed to be relatively hasty considering that the proposal was met 
 
 46  See BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41350, THE DODD-FRANK WALL 
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: ISSUES AND SUMMARY, SUMMARY 
(2010) (declaring that “Congress responded to the crisis by enacting the most 
comprehensive financial reform legislation since the 1930s” while also noting that 
there was no proposed reform plan until the summer of 2009). 
 47  The Group of Thirty is a “private, nonprofit, international body composed of 
very senior representatives of the private and public sectors and academia” that “aims 
to deepen understanding of international economic and financial issues, to explore 
the international repercussions of decisions taken in the public and private sectors, 
and to examine the choice available to market practitioners and policymakers.”  
History of the Group, GROUP OF THIRTY, http://www.group30.org/about.shtml (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2011). 
 48  See Kevin G. Hall, Economists: Banks that Survive Need Tougher Rules, MCCLATCHY 
NEWSPAPERS (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/01/15/59763 
/economists-banks-that-survive.html. 
 49  See Wall Street Reform: How We Got Here, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,  
http://replay.waybackmachine.org/20100826004406/http://www.financialstability.g
ov/roadtostability/timeline.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2011). 
 50  See Stephen Labaton, Senate Plan to Overhaul Wall Street is Unveiled, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 11, 2009, at B1. 
 51  Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th 
Cong. § 1117 (2009). 
 52  See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 533 (“The prospects for including a 
restriction on proprietary trading in the final financial reform bill increased 
dramatically on January 21, 2010.”). 
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with much backlash; even Chairman Dodd described it as coming too 
late into the process.53  Moreover, “when Senators Merkley and Levin 
introduced their Prop Trading Act,” in early March 2010, it was 
viewed as additional evidence that the rule was “dead” because, 
otherwise, it would have been included in the overall financial reform 
bill.54 
This belief was ultimately incorrect as Chairman Dodd 
introduced a revised financial reform bill on March 15, 2010, which 
included the Volcker Rule with the additional requirement that the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) conduct a study that 
would include recommended modifications to the rule’s “definitions, 
prohibitions, requirements, and limitations.”55  The SEC’s filing of 
fraud charges against Goldman Sachs on April 16, 2010 has been 
cited as a major momentum booster of the rule’s inclusion in the 
Dodd Frank Act.56  On May 10, 2010, Senators Merkley and Levin 
introduced a modified version of the Prop Trading Act as an 
amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act.57  The amendment to the Dodd 
Frank Act including the Volcker Rule was passed by the House of 
Representatives on June 30, 2010, and by the Senate on July 15, 2010; 
President Obama signed the bill into law on July 21, 2010.58  The 
legislative process since then will be discussed in greater detail in Part 
IV, but a few quick points bear mentioning here.  It should come as 
no surprise that Wall Street lobbied substantially throughout the 
process, but what is surprising is the extensive public interest in the 
legislative process behind the Volcker Rule, including almost 8,000 
public-comment letters received by the FSOC in the initial public-
comment period.59  Now, over two years removed from the rule’s 
passage, and following considerable delays, the regulators have 
 
 53  See Randall D. Guynn, The Financial Panic of 2008 and Financial Regulatory 
Reform, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION (Nov. 20, 
2010, 11:22 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/11/20/the-financial 
-panic-of-2008-and-financial-regulatory-reform. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 5 (quoting S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 
619(g)(1)(B) (as introduced to the S. Banking Comm., Mar. 15, 2010)).  
 56  See Guynn, supra note 53; see generally SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. 
Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), cert. denied, No. 10 Civ. 3229 (BSJ) (MHD), 2011 WL 
4940908 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2011). 
 57  S. Amdt. 3931, 111th Cong. (2010); 156 CONG. REC. S3482-83 (daily ed. May 
10, 2010) (amending S. 3217). 
 58  Jim Puzzanghera, Financial Overhaul is Signed Into Law, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 
2010, at A1. 
 59  See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe The Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of 
Financial Reform 6–7 (Duke Law Scholarship Repository, Working Paper No. 2445, 
2012), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2445.  
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released a 298-page draft proposal60 that “includes 350 questions on 
which the regulators have requested public input.”61 
In the end, the question remains: why target proprietary 
trading?  As mentioned in Part I, the prohibition of proprietary 
trading stems from the significant contribution of banks’ proprietary 
trading losses to “the freezing of global financial markets, helping to 
precipitate more than $17 trillion in investment losses and 
necessitating bailouts by governments all over the world.”62  But this 
contention is highly disputed.  For instance, Senators Merkley and 
Levin point only to the unethical proprietary trading of Goldman 
Sachs and Merrill Lynch—which both resulted in the SEC filing 
extensive charges of fraud against them63—in describing the ills of 
banks’ proprietary trading.64  But the rule will have an impact on 
2,096 U.S. national banks, according to a recent impact analysis 
conducted by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).65  
Of those 2,096 banks, 1,831 will only have the minimal compliance 
requirements, but still, the OCC estimates that the rule will create an 
aggregate of $50 million in annual legal and compliance costs.66  
Further, the OCC estimates an additional $917 million in capital 
costs.67  Most of these capital costs stem from the rule’s prohibition 
on “banks having more than three percent of their Tier 1 capital68 
 
 60  Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, 
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-
01 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011) [hereinafter “Proposed Volcker Rule”].  
 61  Ted Kaufman, The Volcker Rule and Occupy Wall Street, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 
17, 2011, 8:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sen-ted-kaufman/the-volcker 
-rule-and-occu_b_1016053.html. 
 62  Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 515. 
 63  See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), cert. 
denied, No. 10 Civ. 3229 (BSJ) (MHD), 2011 WL 4940908 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2011); 
Press Release, SEC Charges Merrill Lynch for Misusing Customer Order Information 
and Charging Undisclosed Trading Fees, SEC (Jan. 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-22.htm. 
 64  See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 515, 525–26. 
 65  See Silla Brush, Volcker Rule Will Cost Banks $1 Billion, U.S. Government Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 28, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10 
-28/volcker-rule-to-cost-banks-1b-u-s-government.html. 
 66  Id.  These costs refer to the estimated expenses incurred by banks on an 
annual basis to comply with the Volcker Rule.  Id. 
 67  Id.  Capital costs are the one-time expenses incurred in a project.  See Cost of 
Capital Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/costofcapital 
.asp#axzz1d3uD3Nqc (last visited October 27, 2011).  So, in this case, the capital 
costs refer to the expenses incurred by banks in bringing their operations in line with 
the Volcker Rule. 
 68  Tier 1 Capital refers to a business association’s “core equity capital,” which 
consists of the sum of the entity’s equity capital (i.e., stock) and disclosed reserves, 
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invested in hedge and private equity funds,” and thus the majority of 
these costs would fall on large national banks “with at least $1 billion 
in trading accounts or investments in hedge funds and private equity 
funds.”69  While these costs certainly appear large when considered in 
a vacuum, they are not necessarily significant relative to the size of 
the financial institutions in question. 
Sometimes across-the-board regulation, even at the expense of 
innocent parties, is necessary and just, but banks’ proprietary trading 
is not one of those situations.70  Analysts have estimated that the ban 
on proprietary trading “could cost billions of dollars in annual 
revenue.”71  Further, not only does the Volcker Rule take away a 
potentially profitable activity from banks, it will be costly to banks, in 
both the form of the aforementioned compliance costs and economic 
consequences that can affect the entire American economy.72  For 
example, Brad Hintz, a Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. brokerage analyst, 
recently predicted that banks’ fixed-income desks could see revenue 
fall as much as twenty-five percent under the measures of the most 
recently proposed draft.73  Furthermore, the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association and consulting firms have warned that 
“the Volcker Rule could lead to higher funding and debt costs for 
U.S. companies and increased inefficiencies in trading that would 
lead to lower returns over time for investors.”74  These costs, 
compared to the compliance and capital costs previously discussed, 
 
and “sometimes non-redeemable, non-cumulative preferred stock.”  Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tier-1-capital 
-ratio.asp#axzz1mPA8bQcU (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).   
 69  Brush, supra note 65 (“The capital deduction provision would affect 34 
national banks with at least $5 billion in trading accounts or covered funds and 
would cost them $770 million . . . .”). 
 70  See Andrew Verstein & Roberta Romano, Assessing Dodd Frank 143–44 (Yale 
Law Sch. Ctr. for the Study of Corporate Law and Yale Law Sch., Research Paper No. 
434, 2011), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/WGM_Roundtable 
_July.pdf (“I have one banking organization that has got to shut down its prop 
trading.  In something like 30 years, there hasn’t been a single quarter in which 
they’ve lost money, not a single quarter, even through the crisis.  So why is it you 
would want to restrain them from a market-making activity that adds liquidity to the 
marketplace, which has been shown demonstrably to be safe and sound, and basically 
rip it out of the banks?” (quoting Eugene A. Ludwig, former Comptroller of the 
Currency under President Clinton)). 
 71  Victoria McGrane & Aaron Lucchetti, Volcker Rule Delay is Likely, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424053111904265504576564623589787108.html. 
 72  See Elliott, supra note 17 (“[The Volcker Rule] will do considerably more harm 
than good for the economy.”). 
 73  See Brush, supra note 65. 
 74  McGrane & Lucchetti, supra note 71 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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are much more significant.  This proposition received additional 
credence on October 10, 2011, when Moody’s Investors Service said 
that the Volcker Rule would be a “credit negative” for bondholders of 
Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley 
because they all “have substantial market-making operations.”75 
A counterargument to this support is that even if proprietary 
trading is generally profitable, the risk of extraordinary losses 
outweighs such benefit.  The findings from the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
mandated study of banks’ proprietary trading by the General 
Accountability Office (GAO)76 help to counter such pushback.  The 
GAO’s study was based on data of twenty-six stand-alone proprietary 
trading desks at the six largest U.S. bank holding companies77 from 
June 2006 through December 2010.78  The GAO found that, over 
thirteen quarters, stand-alone proprietary trading produced 
combined revenues of $15.6 billion in six firms, but losses over the 
five other quarters of $15.8 billion, resulting in an overall loss of 
about $221 million.79  First, this means that, as a whole, the six banks 
lost an average of about $12.25 million a quarter, which fails to 
establish the extraordinary danger and risk of banks taking part in 
proprietary trading.  It also seems to explicitly go against the 
proposition that proprietary trading is a significant revenue stream 
for banks.  If one were to discount the extreme losses of five quarters, 
revenues would be near $20 billion.  Even more telling is that four of 
the six firms made money from stand-alone proprietary trading over 
the four-and-a-half-year period, and only two lost money, which is not 
readily apparent from the study because the GAO “portrayed the 
activity in the aggregate . . . .”80 
While the fact that only two of the six banks suffered losses adds 
doubt to the proposition that proprietary trading was a major cause 
 
 75  See Brush, supra note 65 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The relevance of 
these companies having substantial market-making activities stems from the difficulty 
in distinguishing between market-making and proprietary trading.  See infra Part III. 
 76  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-529, PROPRIETARY TRADING: 
REGULATORS WILL NEED MORE COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION TO FULLY MONITOR 
COMPLIANCE WITH NEW RESTRICTIONS WHEN IMPLEMENTED (2011) [hereinafter GAO-
11-529], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11529.pdf. 
 77  Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, 
and Morgan Stanley.  Id. at 3 n.5. 
 78  See id. at 14. 
 79  Id. 
 80  Bradley K. Sabel, General Accountability Office Struggles with Dodd-Frank’s Volcker 
Rule, THE HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Aug. 26, 
2011, 10:11 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/08/26/general 
-accountability-office-struggles-with-dodd-franks-volcker-rule. 
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of the financial crisis, looking at the data while eliminating the large 
losses of five quarters seems to ignore the argument that the rule is 
justified because the risk of large losses outweighs the potential 
benefit.  Even the GAO study indicated that “stand-alone proprietary 
trading generally produced small revenues over several years as 
opposed to large losses during the financial crisis.”81  But the key 
phrase is “during the financial crisis,” and the merit of analyzing the 
numbers without the extreme losses of five particular quarters is 
justified because the proprietary trading that resulted in such 
significant losses was due to the mortgage crisis rather than typical 
proprietary trading.  Banks’ losses resulted primarily from a decrease 
in the value of long-term investments, most notably “mortgage-
backed securities that banks chose to hold to maturity rather than 
tradeas well as collateralized debt obligations they repurchased 
from off-balance-sheet funding vehicles.”82  It was not the activity—
proprietary trading—that was problematic; rather, it was the 
particular object of some of such activity that was troublesome.  
Considering this in conjunction with the fact that only two of the six 
banks still suffered losses on their proprietary trading, a prohibition 
on all banks’ proprietary trading may be overreaching and ultimately 
misguided.  Even the GAO, while pointing out that proprietary 
trading as well as hedge and private equity fund investments are 
riskier than traditional trading activities, indicated that, outside of the 
crisis, both activities produced revenue for the banks.83 
Presumably, the remaining justification for an across-the-board 
ban, even though not every bank took part in unduly risky 
proprietary trading, is that the actions of a few can have an 
overwhelming impact on the market as a whole, especially if those few 
are some of the most powerful banks.  This assumption, while 
conceptually valid, still does not adequately address the inequity of 
penalizing all for the acts of some by prohibiting proprietary trading.  
Rather, it simply sets forth an excuse for doing so.  The fact remains 
that there has not been any showing that proprietary trading 
prohibited under the Volcker Rule was “responsible for the collapse 
or near collapse of any regulated bank . . . .”84  So, again, why 
proprietary trading?  Volcker himself was asked during his February 
2010 testimony before the Senate Banking Committee to name a 
 
 81  Id. 
 82  Whitehead, supra note 9, at 41–42 n.10; see also RAJAN, supra note 10; Mckenzie, 
supra note 10. 
 83  See GAO-11-529, supra note 76, at 22. 
 84  See Verstein, supra note 70, at 121–22. 
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bank that had collapsed because of proprietary trading losses, and he 
could not name any.85  Instead, Volcker answered that the rule was 
intended to deal with future concerns rather than actual problems in 
the past.86  Obviously, thinking about the future is prudent, but as H. 
Rodgin Cohen of Sullivan & Cromwell articulately explained recently: 
[I]t would seem that an expansive reading of a prohibition 
is less justified when it is directed to speculation about the 
future rather than being necessary to respond to 
demonstrated problems. . . . [T]he regulators must take 
care that the statutory provisions are not implemented to 
cause the very damage they were designed to prevent.87 
While this Comment will expand on Cohen’s point in Part V, 
Volcker’s comments and Cohen’s response provide an answer the 
question of “why proprietary trading?”  The answer is concern over 
risk for the banking system.88 
A.  Further Look at the Banking System and Why Its Exposure to Risk is 
Worthy of Concern 
In order to understand the Volcker Rule itself, it is necessary to 
look further at the banking system to determine why there is such 
significant concern over its exposure to risk.  Thousands of pages 
from the Federal Reserve (the “Fed”), obtained under the Freedom 
of Information Act, and central bank records of more than twenty 
thousand transactions from 2007 to 2009 recently uncovered details 
of the largest bank bailout in U.S. history.89  Banks were in such a 
bind that they requested and received from the Federal Reserve $1.2 
trillion on December 5, 2008—their single neediest day.90  The fact 
that the Federal Reserve provided emergency relief to the banks is 
not problematic itself, as “[s]erving as a ‘lender of last resort’ is 
historically one of the main roles of a central bank.”91  But the Fed 
 
 85  Id. at 122. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. 
 89  See Bob Ivry, Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, Secret Fed Loans Gave $13 Billion 
Undisclosed to Congress, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com 
/news/2011-11-28/secret-fed-loans-undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in 
-income.html. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Matthew Yglesias, How the Fed’s Generosity Made $13 Billion for America’s Biggest 
Banks, SLATE (Nov. 28, 2011, 8:39 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox 
/2011/11/28/how_the_fed_s_generosity_made_13_billion_for_america_s_biggest 
_banks.html. 
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loans given to the banks were “among the cheapest around, with 
funding available for as low as 0.01 percent in December 2008.”92  
Regrettably, while almost all of the loans were repaid and the 
Treasury did not sustain any losses, the significantly below-market 
rates of the loans allowed banks to make an estimated $13 billion of 
income gained at the expense of taxpayers.93 
But again, these loans were not made to make up for losses 
sustained in proprietary trading, and as the aforementioned GAO 
study showed, the largest banks did not typically suffer significant, if 
any, losses from proprietary trading.94  Many, perhaps most, banks 
that received the loans needed more liquidity due to decreasing 
confidence following the collapses of Bear Sterns and Lehman 
Brothers, among others.95  In fact, when it comes to the true dangers 
stemming from risky proprietary trading, the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers96 is illustrative as it not only shows why many banking entities 
take on such risk, but how better monitoring and control of such risk 
could prevent an adverse, large-scale fallout. 
Lehman’s business strategy was like other major investment 
banks’ strategies at the time, as they followed a high-risk, high-
leverage model.97  Lehman was a publicly-traded corporation and 
thus followed the idea of shareholder primacy, meaning the 
company’s foremost objective was to maximize shareholder value 
(i.e., increase the stock price).98  The concept of shareholder primacy 
stems from the fundamentals of corporate governance laws that have 
their roots in agency law, namely the fiduciary duties that corporate 
directors—the agents—owe to shareholders—the principals.99  At the 
end of January 2008, Lehman reported record revenues of almost $60 
billion and income over $4 billion for the preceding fiscal year.100  At 
 
 92  Id. 
 93  See Ivry et al., supra note 89. 
 94  See generally GAO-11-529, supra note 76. 
 95  See Ivry et al., supra note 89. 
 96  See generally In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, 433 B.R. 113 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 97  See Report of Anton. R. Valukas, Examiner, at 3, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, 
No. 08-13555  (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010 (08-13555 (JMP)), available at 
http://www.jenner.com/lehman/lehman/VOLUME%201.pdf.   
 98  See Steve Denning, The Dumbest Idea in the World: Maximizing Shareholder Value, 
FORBES (Nov. 28, 2011, 1:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011 
/11/28/maximizing-shareholder-value-the-dumbest-idea-in-the-world/.  
 99  See generally Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy, 
18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 833, 836–38 (2011).  Of course, not everyone believes in 
shareholder primacy.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006). 
 100  See Report of Valukas, supra note 97, at 2. 
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this time, Lehman’s stock traded up to $65.73 per share, but less than 
eight months later, “on September 12, 2008, Lehman’s stock closed 
under $4,” a decrease of almost 95% from January 2008.101  Three 
days later, Lehman filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, “the largest 
bankruptcy proceeding ever filed.”102 
How exactly did this happen to an investment bank that 
maintained “approximately $700 billion of assets, and corresponding 
liabilities, on capital of approximately $25 billion”?103  Well, the assets 
were largely long term, while the liabilities were predominantly short 
term, and because of this, to meet its liabilities, Lehman had to 
“borrow tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in those markets each 
day from counterparties to be able to open for business.”104  Under 
such a scenario, lender confidence in Lehman was obviously of the 
utmost importance.105  In 2006, Lehman had decided to take on 
significantly greater risk and greatly increase leverage on its capital.106  
In 2007, the subprime mortgage crisis reached full steam, and 
Lehman failed to recognize this “developing storm and its spillover 
effect” upon its other business lines.107 
Instead of cutting its losses—remember the concept of 
shareholder primacy, and note that corporate directors are elected by 
shareholders—Lehman consciously decided to “double down” in 
hopes of turning a profit and under the idea that the mass exodus of 
subprime originators actually provided a substantial opportunity to 
those who could weather the storm.108  In doing so, Lehman 
“significantly and repeatedly exceeded its own internal risk limits and 
controls.”109  This is an important point as it shows that a mess like 
Lehman’s is not inevitable when it comes to proprietary trading, and 
sufficient internal controls—if followed of course—can limit the risk 
of the banking industry that Volcker invokes as justification for a 
prohibition of proprietary trading. 
It was not long until it became abundantly clear that Lehman’s 
“double-down” strategy was doomed from its inception, especially 
after Bear Sterns imploded in March 2008 as “[t]he markets were 
 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Id. at 3. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. 
 106  See Report of Valukas, supra note 97, at 4. 
 107  Id.  
 108  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 109  Id. 
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shaken by Bear’s demise, and Lehman was widely considered to be 
the next bank that might fail.”110  But to buy more time and maintain 
the previously mentioned critical confidence, Lehman used an 
“accounting-gimmick,” legal under Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles—an example of the ills of a rules-based approach—to 
“paint[] a misleading picture of its financial condition.”111  On 
September 12, two days after Lehman reported a $41 billion liquidity 
pool, the pool actually contained less than $2 billion of liquid 
assets.112  Lehman’s bankruptcy had widespread effects: the Dow Jones 
index plunged 504 points on September 15, and on the following 
day, in part due to losses suffered on its exposure to Lehman, AIG 
was on the verge of collapse until “the Government intervened with a 
financial bailout package that ultimately cost about $182 billion.”113 
Adding to the necessity of some regulation aimed at curbing 
such risk, the Examiner in the Chapter 11 proceeding found that 
Lehman’s senior officers did not violate their fiduciary duties 
through their actions that led to the corporation’s financial condition 
and ultimate failure.114  But the Examiner also concluded that 
“Lehman was more the consequence than the cause of a 
deteriorating economic climate,” and in his report noted that by their 
own admissions, Government agencies “might better have anticipated 
or mitigated the outcome.”115  These two points—in conjunction with 
the fact that Lehman consciously decided to take on risk greater than 
its own internal controls allowed for—support the recommendation 
that the ban be repealed in favor of legally mandated oversight to 
prevent and penalize unethical or reckless proprietary trading, 
including full disclosure of banks’ trading activity to the appropriate 
regulatory bodies who will have discretion in enforcement of the 
rule.116 
III.  BREAKDOWN OF THE VOLCKER RULE 
The Volcker Rule prohibits banking entities from taking part in 
proprietary trading or investing in or sponsoring any private equity 
 
 110  Id. at 5. 
 111  Id. 
 112  Report of Valukas, supra note 97, at 10. 
 113  Id. at 13–14 (identifying the collapse of a $62 billion money market fund and 
the congressional passing of a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program rescue 
package as other possible effects). 
 114  Id. at 43–58. 
 115  Id. at 2–3. 
 116  See discussion infra Part 0. 
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firm or hedge fund.117  This Comment will focus primarily on the ban 
of proprietary trading, but will discuss some of the more important 
implications regarding the regulation of banks’ investments in, and 
relationships with, hedge funds and private equity funds.  Thus, for 
now, it is sufficient to point out that the limitation on investing in or 
sponsoring such funds has three central purposes: 
(1) [e]nsure that banking activities do not invest in or 
sponsor such funds as a way to circumvent the Volcker 
Rule’s restrictions on proprietary trading; (2) [c]onfine the 
private fund activities of banking entities to customer-
related services; and (3) [e]liminate incentives and 
opportunities for banking entities to “bail out” funds that 
they sponsor, advise, or where they have a significant 
investment.118 
The rule also mandates, among other restrictions, additional capital 
requirements and quantitative limitations to be imposed on non-bank 
financial firms supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (the “Board”).119 
Subsection B of the rule required the FSOC to conduct a study 
and make recommendations for the rule’s implementation with 
specific attention to certain factors that include, but are not limited 
to (1) protecting taxpayers and consumers by enhancing financial 
stability through minimizing the risk that banking entities engage in, 
(2) promote and enhance the safety and soundness of banking 
entities, (3) reduce conflicts of interest between the self-interest of 
banking entities and their customers, and (4) limit activities that have 
caused unreasonable risk or loss in banking entities.120  The FSOC 
Study was published on January 18, 2011.121  The FSOC set forth ten 
recommendations: 
(1) Require banking entities to sell or wind down all 
impermissible proprietary trading desks. 
(2) Require banking entities to implement a robust 
compliance regime, including public attestation by the CEO 
of the regime’s effectiveness. 
(3) Require banking entities to perform quantitative 
analysis to detect potentially impermissible proprietary 
 
 117  12 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (2006). 
 118  FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS 
& PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 6 (2011). 
 119  § 1851(a)(2). 
 120  § 1851(b)(1). 
 121  FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 3. 
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trading without provisions for safe harbors. 
(4) Perform supervisory review of trading activity to 
distinguish permitted activities from impermissible 
proprietary trading. 
(5) Require banking entities to implement a mechanism 
that identifies to Agencies which trades are customer-
initiated. 
(6) Require divestiture of impermissible proprietary trading 
positions and impose penalties when warranted. 
(7) Prohibit banking entities from investing in or 
sponsoring any hedge fund or private equity fund, except to 
bona fide trust, fiduciary or investment advisory customers. 
(8) Prohibit banking entities from engaging in transactions 
that would allow them to “bail out” a hedge fund or private 
equity fund. 
(9) Identify “similar funds” that should be brought within 
the scope of the Volcker Rule prohibitions in order to 
prevent evasion of the intent of the rule. 
(10) Require banking entities to publicly disclose permitted 
exposure to hedge funds and private equity funds.122 
The FSOC study also stressed that regulators must be “flexible 
and dynamic” in implementing and policing the rule, in part because 
“markets, products and trading activities will continue to evolve.”123  
This is in reference to the rule’s requirement that within nine 
months of the FSOC completing its study, the OCC, Treasury, the 
Board, the FDIC, and the SEC shall consider the findings of the study 
and adopt rules to carry out the Volcker Rule.124  Thus, there was 
originally an October 18, 2011 deadline for the finalized Volcker 
Rule, but that deadline has lapsed as the aforementioned regulatory 
bodies released their proposed draft on October 6, 2011, and the 
public comment period did not end until February 13, 2012.125 
The statute mandates that the Volcker Rule take effect on July 
21, 2012.126  But as of January 2013, the Volcker Rule has not been 
 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. at 26, 32. 
 124  § 1851(b)(2)(A). 
 125  Proposed Volcker Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011); see 
also Cheyenne Hopkins, Regulators Extend Comment Period on Volcker-Rule Proposal, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 23, 2011, 3:04 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12 
-23/u-s-regulators-delay-comment-period-on-volcker-rule-proposal.html.  Some had 
speculated that the delay was a “sign of the Volcker Rule’s complexity and 
controversy.”  McGrane & Lucchetti, supra note 71.  This speculation has arguably 
proved to be correct as will be expanded upon in Part IV. 
 126  § 1851(c)(1). 
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finalized, and thus, has yet to take effect.127  Regardless, banks are 
granted an initial grace period of two years to bring their operations 
and investments into compliance with the rule.128  The Board may 
extend the grace period one year at a time, but cannot give such 
extensions to a bank that exceeds an aggregate of three years, which 
means it is conceivable that a bank can have a grace period up to five 
years.129  Furthermore, the Board can extend the period even further 
as necessary to fulfill a contractual obligation that was in effect on 
May 1, 2010, to keep an interest in an illiquid fund.130  This is a one-
time extension, but may be as long as five years.131  Finally, additional 
capital requirements, as the Board deems necessary, can be imposed 
on any banking entity during the transition period.132  Implementing 
these recommendations, specifically the ones that impose an 
affirmative duty on banks to collect and test new data, such as the 
quantitative metrics and to compare bank trading with hedge fund 
and other proprietary operations, will likely be expensive.133 
The specificity of bank activity definitions will be crucial to the 
rule’s effectiveness.  Realizing this, the FSOC included in its study 
some recommended quantitative metrics to help distinguish 
proprietary trading from the rule’s permitted activities.134  While this 
Comment will discuss these quantitative metrics and the implications 
of the current definitions at greater length in Part IV, for now, it is 
important to note some of these definitions.  Subsection (h) of the 
rule lists its central definitions.135  As noted earlier, the statute 
explicitly prohibits a banking entity from “engag[ing] in proprietary 
trading” or “acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any equity, partnership, or 
other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a hedge fund or private 
equity fund,” subject to certain exceptions.136  The term “banking 
entity” means “any insured depository institution . . . , any company 
that controls an insured depository institution, or that is treated as a 
bank holding company for purposes of section 8 of the International 
 
 127  Fragmented U.S. Regulatory System Stalls Dodd-Frank Rules-GAO, REUTERS (Jan. 23, 
2013, 6:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/23/financial-regulation-
gao-idUSL1N0ASHV320130123. 
 128  § 1851(c)(2). 
 129  Id. 
 130  § 1851(c)(3)(A). 
 131  § 1851(c)(3)(B). 
 132  § 1851(c)(5). 
 133  See Whitehead, supra note 9, at 52; see also Stewart, supra note 23. 
 134  FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 36–37. 
 135  § 1851(h). 
 136  § 1851(a), (d). 
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Banking Act of 1978, and any affiliate or subsidiary of any such 
entity.”137 
The term “proprietary trading,” as used in the statute, is defined 
as 
engaging as a principal for the trading account of the 
banking entity or nonbank financial company supervised by 
the Board in any transaction to purchase or sell, or 
otherwise acquire or dispose of, any security, any derivative, 
any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, any 
option on any such security, derivative, or contract, or any 
other security or financial instrument that the appropriate 
Federal banking agencies, the [SEC], and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission may, by rule as provided in 
subsection (b)(2), determine.138 
Central to this definition is the term “trading account,” which is 
defined as “any account used for acquiring or taking positions in 
securities and [financial] instruments . . . for the purpose of selling in 
the near term (or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit 
from short-term price movements)” and other accounts the 
regulators may identify.139  Again, the implications—including some 
problems that the ambiguity and/or impracticality of the definitions 
create—are expounded upon in Part IV. 
Subsection (d) of the Volcker Rule lists exemptions from the 
rule in the form of permitted activities that would otherwise be 
considered proprietary trading.140  Permitted activities include, but 
are not limited to, market-making,141 hedging to mitigate risk,142 
trading activities “on behalf of customers,”143 and proprietary trading 
conducted by a banking entity provided that the trading occurs 
“solely outside of the United States and [] the banking entity is not 
directly or indirectly controlled by a banking entity that is organized 
under the laws of the United States or of one or more States.”144  All 
four of these permitted activities raise serious questions, and 
depending on how they are interpreted, can possibly lead to adverse 
effects on the American economy.  This point is discussed further in 
 
 137  § 1851(h)(1)(A)–(D).  Certain limited purpose trust institutions are not 
considered banking entities under this section. 
 138  § 1851(h)(4). 
 139  § 1851(h)(6). 
 140  § 1851(d). 
 141  § 1851(d)(1)(B). 
 142  § 1851(d)(1)(C). 
 143  § 1851(d)(1)(D). 
 144  § 1851(d)(1)(H). 
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Part IV. 
The full scope of the permitted activities remains to be finalized 
as the rule also gives regulators the ability to permit any trading 
activities that “promote and protect the safety and soundness of 
banking entities and U.S. financial stability.”145  But any of the 
otherwise-permitted activities will still be prohibited if it will result in 
a “material conflict of interest” with clients or a “material exposure to 
high-risk assets or high-risk trading activities.”146 
The FSOC Study included factors—with minimal detail—that 
regulators can consider.147  For instance, Charles Whitehead has 
argued that one of the factors—”that concerns are ‘elevated’ when 
instruments are complex, highly structured or opaque, illiquid or 
hard-to-value”—would “require coordination across multiple business 
units within a bank, or involve significant information 
asymmetries.”148  Furthermore, assets and/or strategies can be 
considered “high risk” simply because “they involve new products 
with rapid growth, embedded leverage, high volatility, or assets whose 
values cannot be externally [priced] or effectively hedged.”149  Until 
regulators make it clear how they will make “high risk” and “material 
conflict of interest” determinations, there will be significant 
uncertainty for banks.  This could have the unfortunate consequence 
of stifling banks’ investment activities that the Volcker Rule was not 
intended to encompass.150 
The two most significant permitted activities are market-making 
and hedging.151  Neither term is precisely defined in the rule.152  This 
is another area of concern going forward, but it is not necessarily fair 
to blame the rule-makers and regulatory bodies for this, as 
distinguishing market-making from prohibited speculative 
proprietary trading is far from easy.153  It is worth noting that this is 
particularly disconcerting because of the integral role that market-
making plays in banks’ capital-raising by “helping to fill a temporal 
gap between sellers and buyers of financial assets.”154  Put a different 
way, market-making is a traditional bank function as it provides 
 
 145  § 1851(d)(1)(J); see FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 16. 
 146  § 1851(d)(2)(A). 
 147  See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 16. 
 148  See Whitehead, supra note 9, at 50. 
 149  Id. 
 150  See infra Part 0. 
 151  § 1851(d)(1)(B), (C). 
 152  Proposed Volcker Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011). 
 153  See infra Part 0. 
 154  Whitehead, supra note 9, at 50. 
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liquidity to lenders without affecting borrowers’ access to reliable 
sources of capital; the difference is that it relies “on capital markets 
rather than traditional buying channels.”155  Market-making 
accomplishes this by having banks serve as the middle-man between 
clients aiming to buy or sell financial assets and third parties seeking 
to sell or buy the same assets.156  Bank customers can either sell assets 
immediately to a market-maker or delay the sale until a sufficient 
offer is found.157  The risk is that the price may move adversely to the 
seller while they wait.  Market-makers—banks—have the ability to 
bear that risk and, therefore, offer immediate liquidity, but almost 
always at a discount from the price that the seller might have 
otherwise received in the future.158  Thus, the market-maker generates 
income in the form of the difference between its purchase price and 
the greater price at which it later sells the held assets.159 
Hedging is also an essential aspect of banks’ business operations, 
and banks can hedge in numerous ways.160  In their traditional 
lending business, banks may hedge interest rates and credit risk, and 
banks may also hedge their exposure to financial assets, including 
those acquired in market-making activities.161  Because hedging risk 
can be accomplished in many different ways, and by hedging, a bank 
can trade financial instruments, which in turn could replicate 
proprietary trading, it may appear to an outside party that a 
legitimate hedging transaction is a violation of the Volcker Rule since 
a direct link between risk and hedging is not always possible.162  The 
FSOC has realized this problem, and in its study, it recommended the 
use of objective data points to help regulators distinguish between 
proprietary trading and permitted activities.163  In their proposed 
draft, the regulatory bodies expanded the role of such metrics.164 
While this Comment will discuss some possible shortcomings of 
these metrics, they are a step in the right direction and will definitely 
be useful in regulating banks’ proprietary trading.  As mentioned, the 
 
 155  Id. 
 156  Id. 
 157  Id. 
 158  Id. 
 159  Id. 
 160  Felix Salmon, How Banks Hedge Counterparty Risk, PORTFOLIO.COM (Oct. 3, 
2008, 11:44 AM), http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2008/10 
/03/how-banks-hedge-counterparty-risk/. 
 161  Whitehead, supra note 9, at 51. 
 162  Id. 
 163  See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 36. 
 164  See Proposed Volcker Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011). 
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difference between proprietary trading and the rule’s permitted 
activities can be very difficult to determine, and these metrics do help 
provide a clearer picture.  But because the statute seeks to prohibit 
proprietary trading rather than regulate it in a more discretionary 
manner, banks and regulators will have a lot at stake when trying to 
distinguish between the two.  This begs the question of not only 
whether a prohibition rather than a more discretionary regulation is 
more effective, but also whether it is sensible.  The rest of this 
Comment will focus on answering this question, while ultimately 
advocating for a more discretionary approach that would require 
transparency of banking entities’ trading activities to the regulatory 
bodies. 
IV.  THE VOLCKER RULE IS UNWORKABLE AND INEFFECTIVE 
The aforementioned difficulties in distinguishing proprietary 
trading from the rule’s permitted activities raise numerous issues.  
Government regulators have been cognizant of these issues and have 
gone to great lengths to combat them.165  Unfortunately, these efforts 
have led to a tremendously complex rule that will be near impossible 
to effectively enforce without unfairly and adversely affecting banks 
and perhaps the U.S. economy in general.  The result is a rule that is 
not only unworkable, but also one that fails to achieve its intended 
goal. 
First, the aforementioned questions regarding the definitions of 
the terms used in the rule have created a number of problematic 
issues that the FSOC study and the regulatory bodies’ proposed draft 
have failed to resolve.  This ambiguity, combined with the rule giving 
regulators broad authority to interpret and modify the statue, creates 
uncertainty.  This in turn can potentially inhibit banking practices 
even further because banks tend to crave certainty.166  The rule and its 
ongoing implementation process, however, will force banking groups 
to remain in uncertain territory for some time.167  The ambiguous 
definition of proprietary trading and the corresponding definition of 
“trading account” have created some critical issues.  For instance, 
trading activity varies among markets and types of assets, so what 
 
 165  See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118; Proposed Volcker Rule, 
76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011). 
 166  See generally McGee, supra note 21.  Banks tend to crave certainty because the 
nature of their activities (i.e., lending decisions—how much, at what rate, etc.) rely 
heavily on not only the current state of affairs but the foreseeable future.  
Uncertainty makes these activities riskier and more difficult. 
 167  Id. 
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constitutes a “near term” or “short term” transaction for one 
instrument could be significantly different for another.168  Further, 
this definition makes the prospect of uniform enforcement much less 
likely because different firms employ different trading strategies.  
Accordingly, what the regulators would view as constituting 
proprietary trading at one firm may not be the same at another.169 
The lack of a definition for the permitted activity of market-
making is even more problematic.  As discussed in Parts II and III, 
banks generate revenue from market-making.170  Banks are contacted 
daily to trade billions of dollars of financial instruments.171  Traders 
outside of a bank can buy, sell, and even speculate in financial 
instruments from derivatives172 to gold. Whitehead uses the example 
of airlines that buy oil futures to lock in energy prices and explains 
that as a result, banks can acquire an inventory of such financial 
assets and maintain exposure to risk in order to meet or prepare for 
customer demand.173  Proprietary trading can be strikingly similar as it 
accumulates positions with the expectation of profiting from future 
transactions and thus, both involve principal trading with customers 
or third parties where the bank may gain or lose as a result of short-
term changes in the market value of the assets.174  This is why 
distinguishing between two activities, one prohibited and the other 
permitted, can be very difficult.175 
Notably, this lack of a definition is not the fault of the legislature 
or regulatory bodies, but rather stems from the difficulty of 
distinguishing market-making activities from proprietary trading.  In 
fact, any attempt at distinguishing the two through definitions may 
prove fruitless as 
 
 168  Whitehead, supra note 9, at 48. 
 169  Id. at 49 (“A longer-term investment, for example, may be resold quickly in 
the face of an increasingly volatile market.  How can regulators distinguish between 
changes in strategy and prohibited transactions?”). 
 170  See discussion supra Part 0. 
 171  See Whitehead, supra note 9, at 50. 
 172  A derivative is “a security whose price is dependent upon or derived from one 
or more underlying assets.  The derivative itself is merely a contract between two or 
more parties.  Its value is determined by fluctuations in the underlying asset. The 
most common underlying assets include stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies, 
interest rates and market indexes. Most derivatives are characterized by high 
leverage.”  Definition of Derivative, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms 
/d/derivative.asp#axzz1d3uD3Nqc (last visited Oct. 27, 2011). 
 173  Whitehead, supra note 9, at 50. 
 174  Id. at 51. 
 175  See McGee, supra note 21 (arguing that “no one seems to know just where the 
blurry line between proprietary trading and market-making is drawn”). 
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Goldman Sachs—and other firms as well—are unlikely to 
accept any regulatory finding that some of those market-
making endeavors are really proprietary trading in 
disguise. . . . [a]nd while [it is] technically accurate that 
they aren’t[,] . . . the already-blurry line between market-
making and proprietary trading [is] likely to become still 
more indistinct.176 
This is a major issue, especially considering that at firms like 
Goldman Sachs, proprietary trading, while significantly successful, 
drastically pales in comparison to its market-making activities.177  Both 
the FSOC and the regulatory bodies have noted that current market-
making activities often include elements of proprietary trading and 
that, in conjunction with differences in market-making for various 
assets and markets, distinguishing between permissible and 
impermissible trading is significantly challenging.178 
In recognition of such difficulties, the regulatory bodies have 
mandated the use of quantitative metrics by banks to help distinguish 
prohibited proprietary trading from the rule’s permitted activities.179  
Whitehead, however, makes the astute observation that while the 
metrics will assist banks’ compliance with the Volcker Rule, they 
create the risk of trading strategies that satisfy the objective 
quantitative metrics while still violating the legislative intent of the 
rule.180  Moreover, the metrics may alter the way that banks do 
business to comply with the definitions of permitted activities, which 
could have the unfortunate consequence of delaying the emergence 
of novel instruments and strategies.181  As this Comment will explain 
further in Part V, these potential problems with the metrics only exist 
because they would be used under the backdrop of a bright-line 
prohibition.  If the rule were discretionary, these quantitative metrics 
would be very helpful in providing adequate clarity to combat the 
uncertainty that would come with such a discretionary approach. 
Another problem arising from defining key terms in the rule 
stems from its exception of banks that operate “solely” outside the 
United States.182  Foreign banks claim that a strict interpretation of 
 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. 
 178  See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118; Proposed Volcker Rule, 
76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011). 
 179  See discussion supra Part 0; FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118, 
at 50. 
 180  See Whitehead, supra note 9, at 51. 
 181  Id. 
 182  12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(H) (2006). 
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the rule may also force them to fire, or in the best case, relocate U.S. 
employees who are involved in proprietary trading, even if no 
American money is at risk.183  Foreign banks frequently hire American 
investment advisers and managers to work on offshore proprietary 
trading, and according to the Institute of International Bankers 
(IIB), if such trading were forbidden under the Volcker Rule because 
U.S. employees are involved, the banks would simply move those jobs 
overseas.184  Sally Miller, the CEO of the IIB, has said that “it’s a jobs 
issue—if we can’t use a U.S. sub-adviser,185 we’re going to use an 
adviser sitting in London or Frankfurt, so that job is not here 
anymore.”186  International banks employ more than 250,000 U.S. 
citizens and permanent residents according to the IIB; Credit Suisse 
Group AG, Societe Generale, and Deutsche Bank AG are among the 
overseas banks that manage trades in the United States and would be 
affected by the rule.187  Furthermore, extending the Volcker Rule to 
foreign banks could make U.S. securities less attractive to foreign 
banks, according to Miller, because employing U.S. firms as sub-
advisers encourages foreign banks to invest in American securities.188  
This incidental effect is intuitive, as employing U.S. firms naturally 
increases foreign banks’ awareness of U.S. securities because such 
American firms will often bring these securities to the attention of 
foreign banks in the course of their business relationship. 
Finally, perhaps the most significant issue with the “solely 
outside the U.S.” exemption is that it places domestic banks at a 
disadvantage to foreign rivals that are not subject to the same 
restrictions in their home countries.  Wayne Abernathy, the Vice 
President of the American Bankers Association, explains that, “[a] lot 
 
 183  See Kalyan Nandy, Volcker Rule Extension Risks Jobs?, ZACKS INVESTMENT RESEARCH 
(Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/61017/Volcker-Rule-Extension 
-Risks-Jobs (explaining with supporting quotes from the CEO of the International 
Banks Institute that the rule is believed to extend to any foreign bank with 
operations within the United States, and if this is the case, foreign banks will close 
any U.S. operations, which currently employ over 200,000 Americans). 
 184  Id. 
 185  A sub-adviser is another management team or firm that manages a sub-advised 
fund, such as a hedge fund or mutual fund, rather than the firm where the assets are 
held.  Definition of Sub-Advised Fund, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com 
/terms/s/subadvisedfund.asp#axzz2CFFxISmb (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 
 186  Cheyenne Hopkins & Ian Katz, Volcker Rule May Be Extended to Overseas Banks 
With Operations in the U.S., BLOOMBERG (Sept. 17, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-16/volcker-rule-may-be-extended-to 
-overseas-banks-with-operations-in-the-u-s-.html.  
 187  Id. 
 188  Id. 
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of what the banks have been doing in recent years to diversify their 
services are activities that can easily be done by foreign 
competitors.”189  Further, banks will lose their top traders, and “that 
ground will have been ceded to hedge funds, foreign financial 
institutions, and specialist trading firms.”190  In their previously-
mentioned study, the GAO admitted that foreign regulators indicated 
that the Volcker Rule could cause U.S. banks to lose business to their 
competitors in Europe and elsewhere.191  Of course, this is an easy 
argument to make—especially at this speculative stage—but banks in 
other countries are subject to other, different requirements such as 
much higher capital requirements for European banks,192 and it is 
unclear as to which rule is worse from a bank’s perspective. 
Even if the rule was effective in eliminating banks’ direct risk 
exposure, there is still the question of whether they will continue to 
be exposed to such risk in an indirect manner.  In regard to the rule 
failing to decrease banks’ risk exposure, Whitehead posits that the 
rule’s prohibited activity by banks will shift to hedge funds, if it has 
not done so already.193  Whitehead argues that the Volcker Rule failed 
to take into account the new relationships within evolving financial 
markets: 
Over the past thirty years, new market participants—in 
many cases, hedge funds—have begun to perform bank-life 
functions that permit banks to extend more credit or do so 
at lower cost.  By causing proprietary trading to move to the 
hedge fund industry, banks continue to be exposed to the 
same risks—perhaps less directly than before, but now in an 
industry also subject to less regulation.194 
This “be-careful-what-you-wish-for” point is important because 
shifting the risk to an industry with significantly less regulation not 
only fails to rectify the concerns that inspired the Volcker Rule, it may 
also increase such concerns because an industry like hedge funds 
incentivizes risk-taking. 
Regulators have made great attempts to address such issues, but 
the result is a proposed draft that is 298 pages accompanied by 1,300 
 
 189  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 190  See McGee, supra note 21. 
 191  See GAO-11-529, supra note 76, at 28. 
 192  David Enrich, EU’s Banks Must Keep Shields Up, WALL ST. J.  (Oct. 3, 2012, 2:29 
PM), available at http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10000872396390444223104578034331569558620.html. 
 193  Whitehead, supra note 9, at 72–73. 
 194  Id. 
PIASIO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2013  4:09 PM 
2013] COMMENT 765 
questions covering 400 topics.195  Despite the regulators’ best 
intentions, this increased complexity has made the rule borderline 
unworkable while also exacerbating its ineffectiveness.196  The draft 
itself notes that putting the Volcker Rule into operation “often 
involves subtle distinctions that are difficult both to describe 
comprehensively within regulation and to evaluate in practice.”197  In 
attempting to shed light on such subtle distinctions, regulators have 
provided a possible path for circumventing the ban through its 
permitted activities.198  Put differently, it could turn out to be 
relatively simple for banks to continue to take proprietary bets with 
their own capital when they choose: 
[S]hutting off one kind of risk taking—proprietary 
trading—won’t necessarily reduce the amount of risks 
banks take, especially as the crisis recedes further in time 
and bankers begin to breathe more easily.  Rather, there is 
a risk that it will simply change the type of risk that those 
institutions take.  True, a bank won’t be putting its capital 
on the line in a prop-trading division, but will it compensate 
by allocating more capital to its market-makers and 
encouraging them to take more risk?  Or by looking for new 
ways to earn higher returns from new and riskier 
businesses—the next-generation of subprime structured 
products, whatever they prove to be?199 
Even some that have previously supported the Volcker Rule agree 
with this notion.  As former Senator Ted Kaufman, Democrat of 
Delaware, has said, “the key word in the rules [is] ‘exemption’ . . . as 
soon as you see that, it’s pronounced ‘loophole.’  That’s what it 
means in English. . . . I know these folks, these Wall Street guys . . . 
[y]ou give them the smallest little hole, and they’ll run through it.”200  
Representative Peter Welch, Democrat of Vermont, added, “I support 
the concept of the Volcker Rule . . . but these rules aren’t going to be 
effective.  We’ve taken something simple and made it complex.”201  
Even Mr. Volcker has admitted to being disappointed with the rule in 
 
 195  Proposed Volcker Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011). 
 196  See Stewart, supra note 23. 
 197  Proposed Volcker Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01, 68,849 (proposed Nov. 7, 
2011). 
 198  Ben Protess, Banking Industry Revamp Moves Step Closer to Law, DEALBOOK (Oct. 
11, 2011, 9:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/banking-industry 
-revamp-moves-step-closer-to-law. 
 199  See McGee, supra note 21. 
 200  Stewart, supra note 23. 
 201  Id. 
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its current state, claiming he would “write a much simpler bill.”202 
To further illustrate just how expansive Mr. Volcker’s original, 
relatively simple idea has become, the proposed draft estimates that 
banks will have to collectively spend more than six million hours 
putting the rule into effect.203  The agencies also estimated that 
10,000 U.S. banks may eventually spend a combined 1.74 million 
hours a year complying with the rule.204  This is a staggering amount 
of time to spend on an activity that does not generate revenue or 
provide customer service, especially for a rule that may ultimately be 
ineffective.  All things considered, serious questions remain as to the 
rule’s practicality and effectiveness. 
V.  RECOMMENDATION 
The significance of the issue and potential problems of the 
current proposed regulation suggest that it may be best to start taking 
a different direction when it comes to regulating banks’ investment 
activities.  The banking crisis and the subsequent bailout of some 
banks illustrated the significance of the “too-big-to-fail” problem and 
why we need greater regulation of banks’ investment activities.  The 
current approach of the Volcker Rule has proved to be very difficult 
to define and implement with problems exacerbating the further we 
go down the rabbit hole.  While many would refute some of these 
problems as speculative, the fact is everything is speculative at this 
stage, and when dealing with an issue of this magnitude, it is better to 
take a more measured approach rather than hastily pick a side and 
hope for the best.  The perils of the No Child Left Behind Act,205 
another well-intentioned yet expansive federal regulation that was 
made in response to a crisis facing this country, support this.206  As an 
alternative, a three-component approach would avoid the pitfalls of 
 
 202  Id. 
 203  Proposed Volcker Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01, 68,849, 68,938 (proposed Nov. 
7, 2011); see also Protess, supra note 198. 
 204  Id.; see also The Value of the Volcker Rule, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2011, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-value-of-the-volcker-rule/2011/10 
/18/gIQATZhUQM_story.html.  
 205  20 U.S.C. § 6316 (2006). 
 206  See Rachel D. Godsil, Opinion: No Child Left Behind at 10: Lessons Learned, THE 
BERGEN RECORD (Jan. 15, 2012 7:10 AM), available at http://www.northjersey.com 
/news/education/nochild_011512.html (suggesting No Child Left Behind’s 
enactment was “prompted by a sense of crisis”); see also Shavar D. Jeffries, The 
Structural Inadequacy of Public Schools for Stigmatized Minorities: The Need for Institutional 
Remedies, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 38 n.147 (2006) (explaining that No Child Left 
Behind’s accountability provisions, while well-intentioned, have resulted in micro-
managing).  
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the Volcker Rule while promoting positive regulation: (1) foregoing a 
bright-line prohibition of proprietary trading in favor of a principles-
based regulation that gives full discretion to the regulatory bodies in 
penalizing violations of such principles; (2) requiring full disclosure 
of all investment activity, proprietary or not, by banks to the 
regulatory bodies on an as-close-to-real-time basis as practicable; and 
(3) imputing some form of significant personal liability to the board 
of directors and individual proprietary traders for violations of the 
rule. 
The first step is discarding a black-and-white prohibition of 
proprietary trading on banks in favor of principles-based regulation 
that does not prohibit proprietary trading but instead gives the 
appropriate regulatory bodies the discretion to mandate the 
elimination and/or stay of banks’ particular trading deemed too risky 
and to penalize egregious violations of the regulation’s principles.  
These principles would include responsible risk-taking that does not 
put the safety of a bank’s continued operations at any risk, due 
diligence in assessing all trading risk relative to the amount of 
exposure to the risk, and refraining from taking any position that 
could be contrary to customers’ interests.  The stated principles 
would be the spirit of the rule.  This would eliminate the unfairness 
of an across-the-board prohibition of proprietary trading and escape 
the unfortunate result of taking away revenue from all banks and the 
problems that it creates.207  More importantly, it evades any inherent 
limitation on the rule’s effectiveness.  Bright-line rules typically 
promote a search for loopholes as their very nature lends themselves 
to “you said this, but you didn’t say this” defenses.208  With a 
principles-based approach, banks will be unable to make arguments 
like “this isn’t proprietary trading, it’s market-making” to evade the 
regulation because if regulators think it violates the spirit of the rule, 
such classifications—that are likely under the current approach—
 
 207  See discussion supra Part 0. 
 208  The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) that provide the rules 
of financial reporting for U.S. Corporations is a well-known example of a rules-based 
approach that lends itself to such defenses, and the SEC has been considering 
changing from GAAP to International Financial Reporting Standards, a principles-
based system of accounting.  See Lance J. Phillips, The Implications of IFRS on the 
Functioning of the Securities Antifraud Regime in the United States, 108 MICH. L. REV. 603, 
616–17 (2010) (“[R]ules provide detailed guidance on how an entity should behave.  
They decline to inquire into the substance of a specific situation and opt instead to 
focus on the form.  Under a rules-based system, a predetermined legal result flows 
from the existence of certain particularized facts. . . . Conversely, principles provide 
an entity with a broadly stated directive, but allow the entity flexibility in choosing a 
course of conduct.”).  
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would be irrelevant.209  Regulators would have the authority to issue 
injunctions on particular trading activity whether it is individual or 
collective.  Moreover, they can penalize egregious violations of the 
principles including violations of any injunction issued.  Because this 
approach could lead to some uncertainty, banks would be able to 
present a proposed action—similar to the SEC and their “no-action 
letters”—to the regulatory bodies and receive a timely response as to 
whether such action would be allowed.210  Also, the quantitative 
metrics currently proposed by the regulators could serve as a further 
guide. 
To be able to effectively exercise such authority, the rule would 
require banks to disclose all trading activity to the regulatory bodies.  
To be sure, transparency would be limited to only the regulatory 
bodies, so this does not raise any “trade secrets” concerns.  This data 
would be kept in independent warehouses.  In their proposed draft, 
regulators have raised a similar possibility that banks might turn over 
their data to independent warehouses.211  Such disclosure would be 
made as soon as reasonably practical, and because the independent 
data warehouses would be online, it should not be difficult to disclose 
almost immediately.  In fact, having individual proprietary traders 
immediately disclose a trade would limit the extensive time and cost 
spent on such disclosure, as it eliminates the need to separately 
collect such data and disclose it at a later time.  When analyzing 
banks’ trading activity, regulators must also consider the risk of the 
activity in the aggregate rather than just that of individual banks 
because what might not be deemed too risky by an individual bank 
may constitute undue risk if banks in the aggregate take part in such 
activity.  This does raise the question of whether regulators would be 
sophisticated enough to adequately analyze such activity.  To combat 
this, regulators charged with responsibility should be paid a 
competitive salary, and while this requires increased funding, nothing 
suggests that such increased funding would be any greater than the 
costs of enforcing the current version of the rule.  The severity of this 
 
 209  See discussion supra Part 0. 
 210  See No Action Letters, SEC (Mar. 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm (“An individual or entity who is not 
certain whether a particular product, service, or action would constitute a violation 
of the federal securities law may request a ‘no-action’ letter from the SEC staff.  Most 
no-action letters describe the request, analyze the particular facts and circumstances 
involved, discuss applicable laws and rules, and if the staff grants the request for no 
action, concludes that the SEC staff would not recommend that the Commission take 
enforcement action against the requester.”).  
 211  See Protess, supra note 198. 
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issue suggests that it would be money well-spent.  Another way to 
increase the sophistication of regulators is to improve education, for 
example, by providing incentives for universities to create 
undergraduate and/or graduate programs in financial regulation.212 
The final component of this principles-based approach includes 
imputing some form of personal liability to banks’ boards of directors 
and individual proprietary traders.  Failure to do so is a major 
shortcoming of the current rule, as the proposed draft only includes 
a question for public comment on the possibility of “C.E.O. 
attestation.”213  The proprietary trading targeted by the Volcker Rule 
“has a ‘tails I win heads you lose’ character, ensuring that profits are 
for bank executives and shareholders, but losses are for everybody 
else.”214  Citigroup’s recent settlement with the SEC over fraud 
charges stemming from some of its proprietary trading is illustrative 
of this.  While Citigroup is paying $285 million to settle the charges, 
“its chief executive at the time the deal was marketed and closed, 
Charles Prince, will pay nothing.”215  Changing incentives helps to 
control risk-taking where expanded regulation falls short.216  Such 
personal liability would require trading decision-makers, and those 
who profit significantly from them, to share the losses when banks 
fail.  Regulation is the only realistic way to institute this personal 
liability because even if shareholders and creditors significantly 
pressured banks’ boards of directors to amend its corporate charter, 
they would unlikely succumb.217  This would be far from 
unprecedented as even recently, provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
not only create the possibility of personal liability for executives at 
publicly traded companies, but also subjects them to criminal charges 
as well.218  While imputing personal liability to bank executives will 
 
 212  Eugene Ludwig, former Comptroller of the Currency under President 
Clinton, recently suggested a creation of undergraduate degrees in “regulation and 
supervision” at the Yale Law School Center for the Study of Corporate Law’s Weil, 
Gotshal & Manges Roundtable on Assessing Dodd-Frank which was held on April 1, 
2011.  See Verstein, supra note 70, at 129. 
 213  See Protess, supra note 198. 
 214  Claire A. Hill & Richard W. Painter, Another View: A Simpler Rein Than the 
Volcker Rule, DEALBOOK (Oct. 28, 2011, 2:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011 
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 215  See Stewart, supra note 23. 
 216  See Hill & Painter, supra note 214 (“Investment banks were compensated 
extravagantly when their bets paid off.  When their bets failed, they might lose their 
jobs, but they could take lucrative severance packages with them and walk away from 
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 217  Id. 
 218  See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 7242 (2012). 
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likely lead to more measured risk-taking, increased internal control, 
and improved information systems when it comes to proprietary 
trading, the recent fallout of the “rogue trader” at UBS suggests that 
it is at least possible that an individual trader can expose banks to 
undue risk without the knowledge of a firm’s executives.219  While this 
may have been the result of lackluster internal control, the rogue 
trader has intimated that because he was fearful of losing his job, he 
kept trading to get out of the hole.220  Personal liability of individual 
traders would combat this as it provides something additional to 
consider rather than simply fearing unemployment. 
This recommendation, which grants full discretion to regulators 
and imputes personal liability on bank directors/executives, will have 
significant opposition, but there is at least one person who would 
support it: Paul Volcker, himself.  Mr. Volcker, expressing some of his 
disappointment with the current version of the rule to the New York 
Times, added, “I’d write a much simpler bill. I’d love to see a four-
page bill that bans proprietary trading and makes the board and chief 
executive responsible for compliance. And I’d have strong regulators. 
If the banks didn’t comply with the spirit of the bill, they’d go after 
them.”221 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The current version of the Volcker Rule, despite its good 
intentions, will fail to achieve its goal of protecting American citizens 
from hazardous risk-taking by banks backed by an implicit too-big-to-
fail safety net from the U.S. government.  Adequately distinguishing 
proprietary trading from permitted traditional bank activities such as 
hedging and market making, as is necessary in implementing a bright 
line rule, has proved to be incredibly difficult.  Both the legislature 
and its regulatory bodies have gone to great lengths, but it seems that 
with every additional consideration, the problems of the current 
Volcker Rule only intensify.  Moreover, the American citizens—whom 
the rule seeks to protect in troubling economic times—face adverse 
effects from the rule, whether it be direct, such as facing additional 
bank fees created by banks to make up for their costs under the rule, 
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or indirect, such as banks decreasing lending or lending at less 
favorable rates due to the loss of revenue from proprietary trading.  
The common thread of these problems with the current rule is that 
they are all a consequence of its bright-line nature in prohibiting all 
proprietary trading. 
The recommendation put forth in this Comment not only 
eliminates this attempt at a black-and-white rule and replaces it with a 
more appropriate principles-based approach, but it goes even 
further.  By requiring transparency in all trading activities on a close-
to-real-time basis, this Comment’s principles-based approach forces 
banks to put everything on the table, which should increase the 
probability of spotting a potential problem before it snowballs into 
catastrophic territory.  This is because full disclosure by all banks 
allows regulators to see the entire picture at all times such as the 
aggregate of the banks’ trading activity, rather than having to piece 
bits together.  Finally, imputing some personal liability to banks’ 
boards of directors and individual proprietary traders provides a 
direct attack on the “too-big-to-fail” problem. 
Whether or not in favor of an approach similar to this 
Comment’s recommendation, the legislature and regulatory bodies 
need to reconsider their current approach.  A “well, we’ve come this 
far” attitude is inappropriate considering the magnitude of the issue 
and the current state of the U.S. economy.  Many believe reinstating 
the Glass-Steagall Act could solve all of this, but as stated, such a 
belief is an oversimplification because the Act would not have 
prevented the banking crisis and its taxpayer-funded bailout.  Still, it 
would have limited the extent of the crisis, and thus, we should learn 
from the hastily-done repeal of Glass-Steagall.  When it comes to 
regulating the American economy, before acting, it is imperative to 
take the time to sufficiently consider the possible repercussions.  A 
failure to do so would result in taking an undue risk at the possible 
expense of American taxpayers.  Sound familiar? 
